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State Dept. review completed.


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## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



December 13, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)

Interagency Group No. 10

MEMORANDUM TO: OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg

NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler

ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel

CIA -

JCS - LTC Dennis Stanley
OSD - COL John Stanford

Negotiator - COL Samuel Watson

SUBJECT: Report of START IG Meeting

Attached is a summary report of the December 6 START IG Meeting.

L. Paul Bremer, III Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

State Dept. review completed.

UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)

BAJSA



### United States Department of State

STAT

Washington, D.C. 20520

## Meeting of the Interagency Group on START Policy

December 6, 1982

### Principal Participants

State
RADM Jonathan T. Howe,
Chairman

ACDA
James Timbie

CIA

OVP
LTC Michael Fry

JCS
BG Elmer Brooks

NSC
Sven Kraemer

OSD
Ronald Lehman

OVP
LTC Michael Fry

Ambassador Rowny briefed the IG on the second round of negotiations and identified the following priority objectives in preparation for the next round: a "Basic Elements" paper which would include Phase II limits, definitions and counting rules (particularly heavy bombers and throw-weight), a position on mobile ICBM limits, and more details on confidence-building measures (including a definition of major strategic exercises).

The IG discussed the "Basic Elements" paper and agreed that such a paper should be provided for use early in the third round. State would circulate a timetable for meeting this deadline.

The IG reviewed the Working Group's paper on the definition of new types of heavy bombers. OSD presented the arguments in favor of specifying objective criteria to identify a bomber as "heavy," and JCS and ACDA argued against this proposal. The IG directed that the paper be sent to the NSC for decision, with agency positions noted.

The IG also discussed options for defining and counting throw-weight. JCS indicated that one option (which required the calculation of potential throw-weight) needed further study to resolve some outstanding uncertainties, and that this additional work could be completed by the end of the week. The IG

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therefore decided to defer sending the throw-weight options paper to the NSC.

The IG discussion of mobile ICBM limits focused on possible US requirements for a mobile, the potential advantages of allowing the Soviets to develop mobiles, and the problems of verifying mobile limits. The Working Group was directed to develop these issues further and to provide a verification package on mobile ICBMs for possible use in the third round of negotiations. (The START/INF Combined Verification Group would provide this package.)

OSD briefed the IG on the status of work on confidence—building measures. The CBMs sub-group would be in a position to provide an interagency document by December 16, leading to a report to the White House by January 25 and a report to Congress by February 1. The preliminary interagency view was that a Crisis Control Center, such as proposed by Senators Nunn and Jackson, was not practical. Instead, the sub-group was working on an international protocol on procedures in a crisis situation. In addition, the sub-group was considering the possibility of establishing facsimile transmission facilities in the NMCC and its Soviet counter-part and allowing this to evolve, over time, into a facility for rapid transmission of data during crises.

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